How GE Exorcised the Ghost of Jack Welch to Become a 124-Year-Old Startup
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Devin Leonard Rick Clough Reprints
Overlooking
the Hudson River in Ossining, N.Y., there’s a grassy, 59-acre campus
owned by General Electric. It’s an executive training center where the
company holds management and leadership classes, some of them led by the
chief executive himself. Jack Welch, who ran GE in the 1980s and ’90s,
would arrive by helicopter. He’d make his way to a windowless auditorium
known as the Pit where a group of managers waited. They used to call
him “Neutron Jack,” because he was known for firing so many people that
only the buildings were left standing. Neutron Jack and his executives
would engage in an aggressive form of corporate group therapy, raising
their voices as they aired their frustrations with the company and each
other. Later, they would have drinks at the White House, the campus bar.
It drove business magazines wild with excitement. “The class sits
transfixed as Welch’s laser-blue eyes scan the auditorium … , ” wrote Businessweek in 1998.
Today, GE executives—sorry, team members—take classes in yoga and meditation and suminagashi,
the Japanese art of painting on still water. The White House has become
a low-key place where visitors can sip artisanal coffee rather than
martinis. The Pit has a window through which the sun shines.
It’s
part of a much larger transformation at GE orchestrated by Jeff Immelt,
Welch’s successor as chief executive officer. Most notably, GE is
moving its headquarters from suburban Fairfield, Conn., land of golf and
bonuses, where it’s been since 1974, to Boston, the Athens of America.
The company is selling off its division that makes refrigerators and
microwave ovens. Now it’s focused on electric power generators, jet
engines, locomotives, and oil-refining gear. And it’s made a significant
bet on developing software to connect these devices to the Internet.
There’s a term for this trend of adding network connections to hardware
not usually considered computers: the Internet of Things. GE believes
its opportunity lies in what it calls the Internet of Really Big Things.
In the past five years, GE has hired hundreds of software developers,
created its own operating system, and fashioned dozens of applications
that it says will make planes fly more efficiently, extend the life of
power generators, and allow trains to run faster. GE’s plan is to sell
this software to other manufacturers of Really Big Industrial Things,
and to be a top 10 software company by 2020. That would put it in the
same category as Microsoft, IBM, and Oracle, an ambition that some have
difficulty swallowing. “Top 10? No way,” says David Linthicum, senior
vice president of Cloud Technology Partners, a consulting firm in
Boston.
GE
is also revising its managerial rhetoric, something it’s also
historically produced in prodigious quantity. The company was officially
founded in 1892 when Thomas Edison merged his operation with a rival
electric light manufacturer. In the 1950s, CEO Ralph Cordiner promoted
the theory of decentralization, which turned 120 business heads into
mini-CEOs. In the 1970s, Reginald Jones championed “strategic business
planning,” which treated the company’s many ventures as an investment
portfolio. As a sloganeer, no one matched Neutron Jack’s ferocity. He
was an evangelist for Six Sigma, a numbers-driven quality-control method
that he didn’t originate but grabbed hold of and turned into a
boardroom craze. He wanted GE to be a “learning enterprise” with “a
boundaryless culture.” He also called it “the greatest people factory in
the world,” one that welded together managers who could run anything
from the plastics division to a television network. (Welch spent several
years dispensing management advice in the pages of this magazine a
decade ago, after retiring from GE.)
Immelt, who took over in 2001, tried to promote his own
management methods. He brought in cultural anthropologists to study
employee behavior. He tried to get his executives to submit “imagination
breakthroughs” that would galvanize GE and generate growth. GE held
“idea jams” to foster creativity.
Nothing seemed to work. GE’s shares were mauled in the
recession of the early Aughts. Meanwhile, its GE Capital division
morphed into one of the world’s largest providers of commercial real
estate debt and aircraft leases. During the financial crisis of 2008,
Immelt was forced to seek the protection of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, which guaranteed about $60 billion of GE
Capital’s debt. The same year, after GE missed its quarterly earnings
projections, Welch declared during an appearance on CNBC that Immelt had
“a credibility issue” and threatened to get a gun and shoot him if he
did it again. The Financial Times reported that Immelt
complained to a group in Washington that he had the misfortune of
managing GE in a turbulent time. “Not only could anyone have run GE in
the 1990s,” Immelt groused, “his dog could have run GE. A German
shepherd could have run GE.”
By
then, Immelt had seen the share price fall from $60 in 2000 below $6.
GE was stripped of its triple-A credit rating by Standard & Poor’s,
and Immelt cut the dividend for the first time since 1938. In 2012 this
magazine referred to Immelt’s first 10 years as “GE’s Lost Decade” and
calculated that investors had seen a total return of zero during his
tenure.
Inevitably, an activist took an interest in the struggling
conglomerate. Last October, Nelson Peltz’s Trian Partners revealed that
it had purchased $2.5 billion in GE shares, becoming its ninth-largest
investor. In an 81-page analysis, Trian said GE had previously been an
unfocused, overly bureaucratic muddle. But rather than call for a
breakup of the company as Peltz has done in the past with DuPont and
PepsiCo, he instead endorsed Immelt’s strategy.
A year earlier, this would have been hard to believe, but by
last fall, Immelt’s program was beginning to succeed. He had announced a
plan to shed $200 billion of GE’s problematic financial assets, which
have weighed down its share price. The company says it had software
sales of $5 billion in 2015, a sign that the
Internet-of-really-big-things approach must be taken seriously. And, by
all accounts, Immelt’s campaign to remake the company’s intrinsically
rigid culture is working. In the past year, GE’s stock has outperformed
the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index. “A lot of people didn’t think
this management team would drive an aggressive transformation of the
business,” says Steven Winoker, an analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein &
Co. “But that’s exactly what’s happening.”
Immelt
enters a conference room at GE’s 53rd-floor office in Rockefeller
Center in New York. He’s 60, 6 feet 4 inches with wavy white hair, and
still exudes youthful confidence and self-deprecating charm. He’s a
former Dartmouth football player and fraternity president who once told
this magazine that he won the Earl Hamilton Varsity Award for friendship
and character, adding that it probably went to the campus beer-drinking
champion.
Although he often wears jeans to the office, Immelt has a
board meeting later this February morning, so he’s dressed in a light
gray suit, pink shirt, and green tie. After some breezy small talk, he
starts going into GE’s transformation, which began in the depth of the
financial crisis. To hear him tell it, he didn’t spend time
second-guessing earlier decisions. “I never sat there and said, ‘Oh,
crap, why do we have so much commercial real estate?’ ” he says.
Instead, he started thinking about data. Many of GE’s
corporate customers were putting sensors on their machines to collect
information about them. That often meant a lot of information: A jet
engine, for instance, spits out roughly a terabyte’s worth of everything
from fuel usage to heat levels to the size of the specks of dirt that
fly through the engine on a trip across America. What were GE’s
customers supposed to do with all that data? Immelt considered teaming
up with a tech company to create software that would analyze vast
amounts of the stuff, but when the tech company figured that out, what
would it need GE for? He thought GE would be better off developing this
software on its own. If nothing else, the company would be able to use
the technology to improve its own productivity; if things went well, GE
would be able to sell it as an add-on to service contracts with
industrial customers. “I said, ‘Look, we need to start building analytic
capability, big data capability, and let’s do it in California,’ ”
Immelt says. “That was as sophisticated as my original thinking was.”
His
own knowledge of the software business was limited. Along with doing
whatever it took to win a character award at Dartmouth, he graduated
with a dual degree in economics and applied math in 1978. After getting
his MBA at Harvard, he turned down a job at Morgan Stanley to work at
GE. He ended up running the health-care division in the 1990s, which
opened a software center of its own in Wisconsin. Because of that, he
says, he knew enough to ask the right questions about software.
If GE was going to set up shop in Silicon Valley, Immelt
wanted a local to run the operation. He went after William Ruh, then a
vice president at Cisco Systems. Ruh was astonished to get a call from a
recruiter who was coy with him about the company she represented,
asking him to guess which one it might be. “I named a name, and she said
no,” he says. “And I named another name and she said no. She said,
‘Name another.’ I said, ‘No, I can’t name anymore. Just tell me, who is
it?’ And she said, ‘GE.’ I said, ‘It can’t be. They don’t know anything
about software.’ ”
Ruh found it hard to believe that GE would be willing to invest the
kind of money it would take to build a successful software business.
Silicon Valley is full of little startups, but creating software at an
industrial scale would require billions of dollars. He also couldn’t see
GE, with more than 300,000 employees, making the cultural changes
needed to compete in the Valley.
Despite
those qualms, he traveled to Fairfield in January 2011 to meet with
Immelt. Ruh says he was impressed by Immelt’s vision and his willingness
to admit that he didn’t fully know what he was doing. “Basically, Jeff
said, ‘Look, we’re on Step 1 of a 50-step process, and I just need you
to help me figure out what to do because I can only see out one or two
steps,’ ” Ruh says. He took the job, and several weeks later his new
boss promised to invest $1 billion in a software operation in San Ramon,
Calif.
GE’s ambitions were greeted with skepticism in the Valley.
In 2012, when Immelt promoted the software venture in San Francisco
during a company-sponsored event with Marc Andreessen, the star venture
capitalist and a friend of Immelt’s warned that it would be difficult
for a hardware company like GE to assemble a team of data scientists
that could perform the kind of tasks that GE had in mind. “It’s hard to
be really good at that,” Andreessen said. “It’s really complicated.”
(Bloomberg LP, which owns Bloomberg Businessweek, is an investor in Andreessen Horowitz.)
Jennifer Waldo, GE’s head of human relations in the San
Ramon office, says recruiters had a hard time just getting people to
come in for an interview. Nine out of 10 software developers they
contacted had no idea GE was in the business or that it even had
operations in California. Nor were they necessarily interested in
learning anything more: Almost all had jobs and couldn’t see any upside
to working for an East Coast microwave oven manufacturer. In 2013, Waldo
appealed to Immelt for help when he visited San Ramon. “I walked him
through all those issues,” she says. “I needed to compensate
differently. I needed to in-source my recruiting team. We were competing
in a marketplace where we’re not even a recognized player.” A former GE
recruiter says the company offered stock options to job candidates, but
not actual stock, the norm in Silicon Valley. There were also no nap
rooms, no on-site child care, no dogs wandering around the office.
Waldo and her team found they could make headway by telling
prospects that they would have a chance to develop trains and power
equipment rather than some inconsequential social-networking app. “I had
a candidate in the early days,” she recalls. “She came in and said,
‘I’m sitting there trying to figure out how to put a Pinterest button on
something, and I get this phone call from GE, and you’re talking about
making aircraft engines fly more efficiently.’ ” (A GE spokeswoman says
the company now includes stock in its compensation for software
developers, too.)
GE also targeted startup veterans who’d spent years putting
in hours for low pay hoping to be the next Mark Zuckerberg. “They went
around to guys who were in their second and third startup and had been
eating ramen noodles for eight years,” says Nick Heymann, an analyst at
William Blair. “They said, ‘Look, how would you just like to have a
normal lifestyle, live an hour outside the Bay Area, make a quarter of a
million bucks a year, and give your kids a really good education?’ ” At
the end of 2013, GE had 750 people working in San Ramon.
By
then, GE had developed an early version of Predix, an operating system
like Windows or Android but for the Industrial Internet. The company
developed applications for Predix enabling it to ingest and analyze vast
amounts of data from sensor-equipped machines much like Amazon.com,
Facebook, and Google do with information generated by their human
customers. Immelt wanted to speed Predix’s development and use it on
GE’s own equipment. That meant the entire company had to embrace the new
operating system, even the power division, which usually took years to
design turbines. There didn’t seem to be much need to rush out new
models; GE’s power customers typically buy steam- or gas-powered
turbines and use them for three decades.
The more Immelt watched what was happening in Silicon Valley, the
more he became convinced GE needed a cultural revolution. He sought
assistance from Eric Ries, a tech entrepreneur and author of The Lean Startup,
a book that espouses the importance of releasing early versions of
products, getting customer feedback, then “pivoting” or changing them if
necessary to improve them. In 2012, GE asked Ries to speak to Immelt
and some of his top executives at the Ossining training center.
Ries was so nervous that he wore a suit. When he arrived at
the training center, he says he felt like he was entering an alternative
universe. The day before, he’d been in Washington visiting members of
the Obama administration. Yet when he mentioned the White House with the
GE people, they thought he was talking about the building on campus
where the bar used to be. “I’m a startup guy from San Francisco,” Ries
says. “I was just like, ‘What on earth is happening here?’ ” Ries was
expecting Immelt to be a brusque, Jack Welch-like character. Then the
CEO showed up in jeans and kidded him about being overdressed. “ ‘I
thought you were from Silicon Valley,’ ” Immelt told him. “ ‘What are
you doing in a suit?’ ” Ries was charmed.
After Ries gave his presentation to the group, he opened the
floor to questions. There was an awkward silence. “Jeff turns around,
and he names one of his vice presidents, and he says, ‘How come you’re
not already doing this?’ ” Ries remembers. “The guy was like, ‘Um,
mumble-mumble-mumble.’ All of a sudden, there were a lot of questions in
the room. It was like, ‘Message received. Jeff thinks there’s something
here.’ ”
That
afternoon, Ries started giving workshops for executives. He later
helped GE tailor its own version of his methods, which the company calls
FastWorks. He says Immelt wanted change, telling him: “ ‘I’m tired of
hearing five-year plans.’ ” GE has since handed out thousands of copies
of The Lean Startup and has trained tens of thousands of
employees in the process. Everyone in upper management seems to use
Silicon Valley-compliant vocabulary, particularly the word “pivot.” “We
encourage people to try things, pivot, try them again,” Immelt says.
“It’s a better way to run the place than centralized command and
control, process-laden.” It’s a sign of his personal charisma that,
unlike many of his employees, the boss can speak corporate jargon and
make it sound profound.
Immelt also thought it was time to revamp GE’s annual review
process to make the company more palatable to younger,
software-literate workers. Under Welch, GE was famous for annual reviews
that ranked all its employees numerically according to their
performance. Then the bottom 10 percent were fired. “The biggest cowards
are managers who don’t let people know where they stand,” Welch told Bloomberg Businessweek in 2012.
“It just didn’t make sense anymore,” says Susan Peters, GE’s
senior vice president for human resources, of the annual review
process. The company decided to scrap them altogether, replacing them
with a gentler system where employees are “coached” by their more
experienced peers.
Unlike some of Immelt’s earlier management initiatives—the
idea jams and the imagination breakthroughs—the new ones seemed to have
the intended effects. FastWorks, according to GE, enabled the
development of a new gas turbine in a year and a half, rather than the
usual five. “This is a billion-dollar product line,” says Steve Bolze,
chief of GE’s power division. “It’s going to expand to be one of our
single biggest launches in our history.”
In April 2015, Immelt announced his plan to sell $200
billion of its GE Capital assets within two years, faster than Wall
Street had expected. Not surprisingly, he called it a “pivotal day.”
Previously skeptical analysts praised Immelt during a conference call
when he explained the plan. Even Barclays Capital’s Scott Davis, who had
speculated only a month earlier that Immelt would soon be out of a job,
was contrite. “Congrats,” Davis said. “I know we have all given you a
lot of crap over the years, but this is pretty good stuff for
redemption. That’s my best apology.” He added, “You can keep your job a
little longer, I guess.”
Along with unloading most of its risky financial business,
GE struck a deal to sell off its appliance division to Haier, the
Chinese conglomerate, and increased its share of the global power
industry with its 2015 purchase of Alstom, a French energy company, for
$10 billion. As a result, 90 percent of GE’s profits will come from
industrial operations by 2018. (During its glory years from the late
’90s into the mid-2000s, GE Capital contributed as much as 40 percent.)
Immelt says this is the GE he’s been trying to create since the
financial crisis, although he acknowledges that it might have been
difficult for outsiders to discern.
In
January, GE announced the move to Boston, where the deer are few and
the software developers plentiful. “Sitting in a rural setting, you can
never be scared enough of what’s next,” Immelt says. “You just can’t be.
You can’t be paranoid enough. And I felt like it would be a good thing
for the business just to be in the flow of ideas.” It could also help GE
attract more young employees with technology backgrounds, which remains
a struggle because most people still don’t associate GE with software.
GE has acknowledged this by running TV ads featuring a fictitious coder
named Owen who gets blank stares from his friends when he tells them
he’s been hired by GE.
“Guys, I’ll be writing a new language for machines so planes, trains, and even hospitals can work better,” Owen says.
“So you’re going to work on a train?” a friend asks.
“No, on trains,” Owen corrects him. “On trains.”
Head count at the San Ramon office is 1,300, including some
refugees from Google and Facebook. It already has aviation customers
using Predix applications to monitor the wear and tear on their jet
engines and calibrate their maintenance schedules based on that data
rather than an average for the entire fleet. It’s created smart wind
turbines that tell each other how to shift their blades to catch more
wind, which GE says can increase their power output by as much as
20 percent.
But
Immelt needs to sell vast amounts of applications and Predix-based
analytics to reach his goal of making GE a top 10 software company in
2020. That’s not a random deadline. Traditionally, GE chief executives
have served 20 years, so his time will be just about up by then. He says
the company already has a succession plan in place. If he can complete
his digital reinvention of the company, he could depart in glory, the
way Welch did.
GE says it’s beginning to sell Predix-based services to
customers who design their own industrial equipment. Pitney Bowes is
using Predix on its mailing-label machines and letter-sorting devices in
corporate mailrooms; Toshiba is using it on elevators. “The Industrial
Internet is going to be the dark matter of the Internet,” promises Harel
Kodesh, chief technology officer for GE Digital, which is what the
company now calls its software division. “It’s something you don’t see,
but it is actually the bulk of what’s happening on the Internet. Other
than porn, I guess.”
That may be, but GE faces competition from all sides. Amazon
and Google are getting into the Internet of Things along with IBM and
Microsoft. There are dozens of small startups with similar ambitions
that don’t need Eric Ries to tell them what to do. Then there’s perhaps
an even bigger unknown: Will other large industrial companies turn to GE
to manage their information? “If you’re a manufacturer of some size and
sophistication, are you going to say, ‘Hello, GE. You can own the data
on my business’? ” asks Brian Langenberg, an independent analyst and
founder of Langenberg & Co. in Chicago. “Or are you going to say, ‘I
think I’m going to do it on my own’? I’m skeptical.”
Not long ago, Immelt gave a speech in Dubai about the
Industrial Internet. He wasn’t talking to tech people “with spiked
hair,” as he puts it. He was addressing attendees who worked at oil
companies and airlines—in other words, his kind of people. Immelt could
see them nodding their heads approvingly as he talked. “It’s moments
like that when you think, ‘This might work,’ ” he says later. “ ‘This
really might work.’ ”
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