To hackers, spies, and cyber-criminals these days, calling
Tor “secure” is a bit laughable. There are so many exploits and
workarounds, along with unavoidable weaknesses to side-channel attacks
performed in the physical world, that in some cases the false sense of
cyber-security can end up making relaxed use of Tor less secure than
paranoid use of the regular internet. If you’re someone looking to buy
some weed on the internet (or communicate securely with your
mistress), Tor is probably alright for you. If you’re looking to sell
some weed on the internet, get in contact with a government informant,
or share sensitive information between foreign activists, it probably
isn’t. Tor is looking to change that.
This is coming specifically in the wake of recent
revelations of wide-ranging vulnerabilities in Tor’s anonymity
protocols. A high-profile expose accused researchers at Carnegie Mellon
of accepting a government bounty (reportedly a cool million dollars) to
de-anonymize certain Tor users (those specifically mentioned in the
expose include a child porn suspect and a Dark Market seller). Their
attack vector and others are just what cynical hacker-forum users have
been prophesying for years, things like malicious Tor nodes and
directory servers that exist solely to suck up the personal info of
those Tor users they serve.
One
major initiative involves the algorithm governing the selection and
use of “guard nodes,” which are the first anonymizing nodes used by a
Tor hidden service, and thus the only nodes interacting with the
legitimate IP, directly. Right now, a Tor connection might use multiple
guard nodes and as a result open itself up to more vulnerability than
necessary — now, the developers want to make sure that Tor connections
use the minimum possible number of guard nodes, and preferably just one.
Another push hopes to reinforce the wall between dark web
domains, the crawlers used by search engines, and specialized
server-finders. One of the strengths of a hidden service is that it’s
hidden — not just the physical location of the server hosting the
service, but the digital address of the service itself, unless you’re
specifically handed the randomly generated onion address. Keeping hidden
services off of search engine results means that a private service can
remain private, used only by those people specifically handed the
address. Should an attacker find that address, Tor’s anonymity protocols
should protect it. But attackers can’t even try to access services they
have no idea exist.
If you’re up to delving a bit deeper into the Dark Web, and
you don’t mind looking at 99 useless sites for every interesting one,
boot up the Tor Browser and take a look at this ingenious hidden service indexing tool for an idea of the level of crawling that can currently be done on the Deep Web.
The Tor Project exists to provide anonymity — that is its
main function, and all other functions are in service to that. So, to
attack the security of a Tor user (even a legitimately horrible
criminal) is to attack Tor itself. It’s a tough principle to stand
behind, at the end of the day — to get mad about police efforts to catch
child pornographers. Yet, the security world is united; security
researcher Bruce Schneider has called Carnegie Mellon’s alleged
collaboration “reprehensible,” as did numerous other academic security researchers.
Their
reasoning is sound. There is simply no way to attack the availability
of anonymity to bad people without also undermining the availability of
anonymity to good ones. We also need to have a class of disinterested
researchers who can interface with the criminal/quasi-legal cyber
underground and have meaningful, honest conversations — we need this for
social understanding, the maintenance of free speech, and effective law
enforcement.
That’s not a perspective that seems to exist in the
government, to any extent. The recent terrorist attacks in Paris have
led to sustained attacks on encryption and anonymity, even before the
investigation produced any evidence that the attackers had used
encryption, and certainly in absence of any evidence that if they had not used encryption that they would have been detected reliably by French or international security agencies. The New York Times, which broke the story of an alleged encryption aspect to the attacks, has since pulled the story from their website.
Of course, the hacker/security community will take some time
to win back, and may never return to the fold. There’s a significant
number of people who still believe that Tor is an elaborate government
honeypot with zero real security from government spying. That’s
unlikely, but ultimately it’s the perception that counts. Can the Tor
Project win back the hardcores? Perhaps not. But with its continuing,
aggressive updates, it could keep us normies safer as we browse
drug-lists without buying, stare uncomprehendingly at ISIS statements
posted in Arabic, and just generally indulge the extremes of
our intellectual curiosity.
In other words, it could keep the basic tenets of liberty alive just a little bit longer.
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